Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

State of Utah v. Brent Jackson, Racquel Nielsen, and
Patricia E. Smith : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Christine F. Soltis; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah State Attorney General; Attorney
for Appellee.
Thomas H. Means; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin; Attorney for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, State of Utah v. Jackson, No. 950696 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6920

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

.A 10

DOCKET MO.

STATE OF UTAH,

Consolidated No. 950696-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Priority No. 2
BRENT JACKSON, RACQUEL NIELSEN
AND PATRICIA E. SMITH,
Defendants/Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

CONSOLIDATED APPEALS FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT, UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, FROM CONVICTIONS OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
VIOLATIONS, IN A DRUG-FREE ZONE, CLASS A MISDEMEANORS,
THE HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS PRESIDING

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Counsel for Appellee
THOMAS H. MEANS (2222)
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, Utah 84603-0200

Telephone:

(801) 373-4912

Counsel f o r A p p e l l a n t s

F I L E D
Utah <>.«+o* Appeals
JAU 3 \ mi
Maniynto.Branch
Clerk of the Court

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
ARGUMENT
POINT I

UTAH CITIZENS HAVE A REASONABLE
OF PRIVACY IN RESIDENTIAL TRASH
PROTECTED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND WHICH
CURED BY APPLICATION OF A "GOOD
EXCEPTION

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT

i

EXPECTATION
WHICH IS
14 OF
CANNOT BE
FAITH"

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Constitutional Provisions
United States Constitution, Amend. XIV
Utah Constitution, art. I, section 14

1, 3
1-3, 7, 8

Cases Cited
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)

1, 5, 7

Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987)

6

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)

2

People v. Hillman, 834 P.2d 1271 (Colo. 1992)

5

Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994)

.8

Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916
(Utah 1993)

3

State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112 (Washington 1990)

4, 5

State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990)

5

State v. Morris, 680 A.2d 90 (Vt. 1996) . . .

5

State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274 (Hawaii 1985)

4

State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991)

2, 6

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)

6

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)

2

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
:

Case No. 950696-CA

vs.
BRENT JACKSON, RAQUEL NIELSEN,
AND PATRICIA E. SMITH,
Defendants/Appellants.

:
:

Priority No. 2

:

ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH CITIZENS HAVE A REASONABLE EXPECTATION
OF PRIVACY IN RESIDENTIAL TRASH WHICH IS PROTECTED
BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
AND WHICH CANNOT BE CURED BY APPLICATION OF
A "GOOD FAITH" EXCEPTION
The State asserts that the United States Supreme Court's
decision in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), wherein
it was decided that citizens have no expectation of privacy in
trash left outside a home's curtilage under the Fourth Amendment,
should apply to the case at hand because a different result is
not warranted under the search and seizure provision of Utah's
constitution.

The State argues that a departure from Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence under the state constitution should be
made only in cases where federal analysis is plagued with
inconsistencies and/or confusion (Br. of Appellee at 12-13).
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However, the State also acknowledges that such criteria "do nor
fully determine the court's discretion to depart from federal
standards" (Br. of Appellee at 12).

Defendants assert that an

independent interpretation of Article I, Section 14 is warranted
just as it was proper in State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah
1991) .
The issue in Thompson was whether individuals had a
recognizable state constitutional interest in their bank records.
Like the issue at hand, the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), had previously held that a
depositor had no legitimate expectation of privacy in bank
records under the United States Constitution.

The Thompson court

held that the privacy of bank records was protected by Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

810 P.2d at 418.

The court

premised its decision in part upon a finding that independent
state constitutional analysis was warranted because the Miller
rule created confusion and was in conflict with the generalized
expectation of privacy test set forth in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).

Likewise, the United States Supreme Court's

holdings in California v. Greenwood and Katz v. United States
create the same confusion and tension and independent state
analysis is likewise warranted.
The State argues further that the framer's of Utah's
constitution did not intend to give Article I, Section 14 of the
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In addition, the State argues that a different result under
the Utah's constitution is not justified because "the handful of
cases which have found an expectation of privacy in trash have
either based their decisions on the unique language of their
state constitutions, are supported by poor reasoning, or have
been rejected by their own superior court" (Br. of Appellee at
28) .
While it is true that Hawaii and Washington have state
constitutional provisions which textually address "privacy" or
"private affairs", the courts in both states based their
decisions of a legitimate expectation of privacy in trash, not
only upon the state's constitutional provision but upon an
analysis of whether society was prepared to recognize that an
expectation of privacy relating to trash was reasonable.

See

State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274 (Hawaii 1985), and State v.
Boland, 800 P.2d 1112 (Washington 1990).
Moreover, Defendants are confident that the State would find
all decisions from other jurisdictions which have adopted a
different analysis—or have advocated a different result — than
that proposed by the State, to be "supported by poor reasoning."
Such a position is inherent to advocacy in an adversarial system.
In this case, Defendants had a subjective expectation of
privacy in their trash left on the curtilage for collection and
such an expectation is legitimate and reasonable.
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Provo City

ordinance mandates the time and place of trash collection.

In

addition, the city also mandates the use and rental of a
particular trash container. Defendants did not abandon their
trash, nor was it left on the street in a manner which invites
public scrutiny.

The trash was left in a closed-container

mandated by the city and was left for collection pursuant to the
requirements of the city.

Therefore, defendants expectation of

privacy was reasonable and should be recognized as such by this
Court under the Utah Constitution.

See, Boland, 800 P.2d at 1114

(reliance on similar city ordinances).

See

also,

State v.

Morris, 680 A.2d 90 (Vt. 1996); and State v. Hempele. 576 A.2d
793 (N.J. 1990). x
Finally, the State asserts the position taken by the trial
court in the denial of defendants motion to suppress: Even if a
state constitutional issue exists, the validity of the search is
upheld on the basis of "good faith"—or the reasonableness of the
officers' belief that a trash search is constitutional based upon
the United States Supreme Court's decision in California v.
Greenwood (Br. of Appellee at 28-32) .

l

Cf.
People v. Hillman. 834 P.2d 1271 (Colo. 1992).
In
Hillman, the Colorado Supreme Court found no state constitutional
recognition of a legitimate expectation of privacy in trash left in
plastic bags on the side-walk for collection.
However, the
Colorado court also recognized that "there may be circumstances in
which a resident may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
garbage
bags that are so positioned within the curtilage of a
residence as to not be readily accessible to the public." 834 P. 2d
at 1277.
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The State argues that defendants have not articulated a
basis for this Court to reject application of a good faith
exception under the Utah Constitution nor have defendants given
this Court adequate legal analysis to reach the merits of the
issue on appeal (Br. of Appellee at 30-31).

However, this

argument ignores that the question of a "good faith" exception
under the Utah Constitution was raised by the trial court and
debated by the parties; and furthermore Utah courts have yet to
address the issue.
Moreover, the good faith exception as articulated in United
State? v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and extended in Illinois v,
Krullr 480 U.S. 340 (1987), was created for cases whether the
police have relied upon an incorrect determination of probable
cause by a magistrate in the issuance of a warrant or upon an
unconstitutional statutory scheme which authorizes such a
warrantless search.
1991).

State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah

This distinction from the case at hand is explicitly

recognized by the State on appeal (Br. of Appellee at 31).

In

this case, there was no reliance by the officers upon either a
decision by a magistrate or upon the regulatory actions of the
state legislature.

At issue in this case is not the detrimental

reliance relating to the officers' conduct but the very
constitutionality of the conduct itself.
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However, the State asserts that a "good faith" exception is
applicable here because the "officers fully comported with all
existing legal regulations at the time of the search, and
therefore, their reliance on that precedent was necessarily in
good faith" (Br. of Appellee at 31). The only existing
"regulation" concerning the constitutionality of trash can
searches in Utah is the California v. Greenwood decision by the
United States Supreme Court that such a search does not violate
the United States Constitution.

There is no precedent which the

officers could have relied upon under the Utah Constitution.

In

addition, the Greenwood court explicitly recognized that
"individual states may surely construe their own constitutions as
imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does
the Federal Constitution."

486 U.S. at 43.

This clearly placed

the officers on notice that such a search may not be
constitutional under the Utah Constitution, and that such a
determination could be made only by Utah courts.

So, while the

officers' reliance upon Greenwood may have been reasonable and in
good faith in federal court or under federal analysis, it is not
reasonable—and definitely not in good faith--under the Utah
Constitution.
Furthermore, should this Court find that a "good faith"
exception is applicable under Article I, Section 14, "judicial
integrity" would require this Court to "extend the benefit" of
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its decision finding trash can searches unconstitutional in Utah
because "it would be unconscionable to deprive [defendants], who
[have] sustained the burden of attacking an unconstitutional
[search], of the fruits of victory, thereby discouraging" such
constitutional challenges.

Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844,

854-55 (Utah 1994)(citations omitted).
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Defendants respectfully request that this Court find the
search of their trash to be violative of Article I, Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution; and that as such, all evidence or
information gained therefrom must be excluded and the trial
court's denial of defendant's suppression motion reversed. In
addition, as argued in Appellants' opening brief, with or without
the information gained from the unconstitutional trash search,
the affidavit in probable cause was insufficient to support the
magistrate's finding of probable cause.

Moreover, Utah does not

recognize a "good faith" exception under Article I, Section 14;
and were this Court to find such an exception, it would be
"unconscionable" to deprive defendants of the "fruits of
victory."
^jT

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of January, 1997.

Thomas H. Means
Counsel for Appellants
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I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two (2)
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160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City,
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